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Labor standards and external promotion of European norms 
 
The European Union doesn’t have its own labor code defining the rights and 
obligations of employees and employers. Employment policy and social policy lay 
essentially within the competences of the Member States. Moreover the EU is not a 
signatory to ILO conventions, and cannot ratify any the ILO Conventions, because 
only EU member states can be signatories. Nevertheless according to the article 153 
TFEU the EU shall support and complement the activities of the Member States 
regarding labor issues, as protection of workers and modernization of social protection 
among many others. Thus labor norms and standards have been promoted via different 
methods and different techniques, and different actors have been involved, not 
necessarily with full consent and support of member states. Aforementioned 
complementary activities could be found in the free trade agreement signed by the EU 
with South Korea, and will be found in upcoming agreements with the US, Singapore, 
India, and Canada.  
The article analyzes limits for external norm promotion by assessing labor 
clauses in EU FTAs and their effectiveness, as well as the relevance of European labor 
standards to other states. It identifies core European  methods and norms for promoting 
labor standards, with emphasis on relations with developed and developing countries. 
The article seeks to move beyond traditional explanations of relatively limited impact 
of European group of norms on labor issues, and proposes an alternative framework of 
analysis, where non-state actors play more important role than EU member states and 
the Commission. Finally, it argues that ethical and moral arguments visible in the EU 
position towards labor rights, evolved, and social corporate responsibility has been 
elevated as another area of possible EU influence, where specific European norms 
could be promoted1.  
 
The article provides in the first part a brief overview of theoretical framework of 
European approach to promotion of European norms regarding labor standards, and 
policy transfer as a promising model of promotion of European norms. Then, it 
examines “promotion of labor standards” as one of driving concepts of European 
external policy, with regards to developing countries, and as an issue of secondary 
importance with regards to developed countries and rising powers. Second part is 
devoted to analysis of free trade agreement with South Korea (KOREU), and proposed 
free trade agreement with the US, and American approach to labor standards in FTAs, 
with emphasis on effectiveness of labor provisions. Part three seeks the explanation for 
European model of labor standards in existing and negotiated FTAs. It argues that EU 
member states decided to lower the bar for labor standards in FTAs, and such lowering 
could be explained rather by non-normative factors than normative claims (as 
European ideology), but also by (probably) lack of communication between national 
representatives and negotiating team, and cleavages between member states regarding 
core labor standards. Moreover the agreed text of all of three upcoming  FTAs (India, 
Canada, and the US) have been not revealed and any assessment of future implications 
cannot be made.  
 
 
I. Labor standards and free trade agreements 
 
As of July 2014 fifty-eight trade agreements include labor provisions, comparing to 
twenty-one in 2005, and four in 19952. Such development, as some authors suggest, is 
particularly visible in the United States, where after NAFTA, and due to strong 
cleavages between two parties, ratification of any FTA is depend on the political 
process. Thus bargain between two parties, supporting or disavowing particular 
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provisions is more important for final agreement than general idea of labor standards, 
but final result, with strong emphasis on labor standards, is more important. In the 
European Union such development occurs as well, however number of bargaining 
parties is much higher than in the United States.  Alasdair Young suggests that, 
contrary to other international norms and standards, where the common denominator 
for EU member states is rather rule than exception3, issue of labor standards to far 
extent follows other differences between liberal Nordic EU member states (British, 
Danish, Dutch, Finnish), and the protectionist South countries (French, Italian, Spanish 
and Portuguese governments - Club Med)4. When it comes to core labor standards the 
EU’s member states could be divided into three groups: those who consider such rules 
intrusive like the UK, and then strongly oppose any labor provisions, those who 
believe in social democratic traditions and perceive “the WTO as a way to promote 
human rights” (like Austria, Denmark, Germany and Sweden), and finally those states 
whom core labor rights are to be instrumental for trade, and  provide a means to 
protection of national interests5. This observation may suggest what kind of 
preferences prevailed during the negotiations over particular FTAs, and then retrace a 
hierarchy of preferences. Nevertheless, states’ preferences not necessarily are reflected 
in the final and agreed text. 
 
As of 2014 labour standards are not covered by the competence area of the World 
Trade Organization. At the first WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996 in Singapore 
question of linking labor standards to international trade has been rejected as a matter 
of the meeting (like the so-called Singapore issues6). In the Ministerial Declaration 
adopted at the meeting,  WTO members reaffirmed their commitment to respect core 
labor standards recognized at international level, while stating that the organization 
competent to establish labor standards is the International Labour Organisation ( ILO). 
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They expressed the belief that the development of trade and trade liberalization will 
enhance promotion of labor standards. However, they made a reservation, that the 
labor standards should not be used for protectionist purposes. Also agreed that the 
comparative advantage of countries, particularly developing countries, the benefits 
resulting from low wages, cannot be questioned. 
  Adopted in 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at 
Work (ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work ) requires 
members of the organization to respect, promote and to realize the four principles 
concerning the fundamental rights which are the subject of ILO conventions. These 
are: 
1. freedom of association and right to collective bargaining (Convention No. 87 
concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 
Convention, 1948, and No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining 
Convention, 1949 ); 
2. the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labor (Convention No. 29 on 
Forced Labour, 1930 or compulsory, and Convention No. 105 concerning the 
Abolition of Forced Labour, 1957 ); 3. the effective abolition of child labor 
(Convention No. 138 concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, 1973 
and Convention No. 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of Child Labour, 1999 ); 
4. elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation (Convention 
No. 100 concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of 
Equal Value, 1951 and Convention No. 111 concerning Discrimination in Respect of 
Employment and Occupation of 1958 ). Compliance with these four categories of 
rights for the members of the ILO is compulsory, regardless of whether they have 
ratified the relevant conventions or not. 
The European Union does not have its own labor code defining the rights and 
obligations of employees and employers. Employment policy and social policy are 
essentially within the competence of the Member States. In accordance with Art. 153 
TFEU, which is the legal basis for EU legislation on the protection and improvement 
of working conditions, the Union shall support and complement Member States' action 
in the following areas: 
a: improving the working environment to protect the health and safety of 
workers; b: working conditions; c: social security and social protection of workers; d:  
protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; e: providing 
workers with information and consultation; f: representation and collective defense of 
the interests of workers and employers, including co-determination; g: conditions of 
employment of third-country nationals legally residing in the EU; h: the integration of 
persons excluded from the labor market;  equality between men and women with 
regard to their labor market opportunities and treatment at work; j: the combating of 
social exclusion; k: the modernization of social protection systems. 
In the first nine listed areas { letters a) - i) } the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union ( TFEU) authorized the European Parliament and the Council to 
adopt minimum requirements in the form of directives. This means that national 
legislation may provide for more stringent standards than those laid down in the 
conventions. As a result, workers' rights and the requirements for health and safety in 
the workplace in the Member States vary. Some of the EU directives apply to classical 
matter of labor law7, the other - the protection of employees in case of massive 
restructuring8. Some of the directives are responses to the new challenges, such as 
atypical employment and the formation of large-scale transnational companies and the 
related posting of workers in the system of subcontracting9. A number of directives 
relates to health and safety10 and collective labor law (including the social dialogue at 
European level and the creation of European Works Council). All EU Member States 
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are members of the International Labour Organisation. Number of conventions that 
ratified the Member States is very different ( eg France - to 124, Spain - 133, Italy - 
112, Poland and Sweden - 91, and Estonia to 38 ). Where the scope of the Convention 
shall be part of the Union's competences, the Member States must obtain authorization 
from the Council to ratify it (Article 3. 2 TFEU). At the same time, the European 
Union cannot ratify the ILO Convention no, because only states can be parties thereto.  
Thus Article 3.2 TFEU creates vague situation for member states. One the one hand, 
there is no common European employment policy, and labor issues and labor 
standards are regulated mostly under domestic law. But on the other hand, 
aforementioned set of directives limits, to far extent, states’ ability to create 
independent and unconstrained system of labor. 
 
In recent years signed bilateral agreements establishing free trade areas, where 
the European Union is a party, various provisions on workers' rights have been 
included. In these agreements various provisions have been adopted which are not 
always included in the ILO conventions. Their shape depends largely on the level of 
economic development of parties. In some agreements one may find provisions for 
limiting the ability of social dumping or establishing a special committee to resolve 
bilateral disputes concerning performance of the contract in the areas of labor law. 
Some contracts provide for recourse to WTO dispute settlement system and WTO 
panels, which does not mean, however, that this option is used.  
The EU adopted or is negotiating FTAs with three groups of states and respective 
FTAa could be distinguished as: developing countries, rising powers and developed 
powers. Classifying particular state to one of these groups translates into specific 
model of relations and expected behavior, where economic factors are crucial 
variables, but must be analyzed from different perspective, and with different 
boundary conditions. This means that given input from European side results in unique 
manner, which depends overwhelmingly on volume of trade between participants and, 
to some extent, level of GDP of non-EU partner. 
Relations with developing countries, based on long-dure tradition of colonial 
supremacy11, usually are treated as relations between unequal players when it comes to 
bargaining power and ability to transfer particular norms. However an example of 
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA), unsuccessful attempt to bond ACP 
countries with FTAs designed and promoted by the EU as ideal solution for 
developing countries of Africa rises a question for discussion of supposedly weaker 
position of African players, and, what is more important, about general idea of 
normative power Europe12. Even some states, grouped in Cariforum, in fact much 
smaller than African countries, decided to sign and implement EPA, it is perceived 
rather as a result of asymmetric bargaining than influence or transfer of European 
norms13. 
Thus given the fact that developing countries, and relatively weaker players in 
the world politics have decided to gratefully accept unconditional European 
development support, but refused to undertake serious commitments might suggest 
that rising powers will be even more assertive. However comparing these two group of 
states one should remember that relations with, for example, Indonesia, Mexico, 
Brasilia or South Korea, are based on different logic. Such countries, with growing 
economies with GDPs based on export, have to build proper relations with demanding 
trading power14. Therefore a room for negotiation is larger, and possibility to transfer 
European labor standards (combined with environment) is higher, when trading states 
want to pursue their economic interests and can agree for concessions. However, 
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closer look on FTA with South Korea (KOREU) provides negative answer for 
normative strategy of European Union, and labor standards (see below) were 
secondary issue for negotiating team.  
Third group represents developed powers, like Canada, the US, Australia, but 
also China and Russia, where roles might reverse, and the EU, seeking for norms’ 
transfer, will have to deal with equally powerful partner in negotiations, and then any 
transfer of norms will be possible only thanks to consent. Like in first and second 
example, economic factor and value of trade will be important for deeper analysis, but 
elements of prestige must not be neglected. Moreover when states form first and 
second group, to far extent, are importers or opponent to European norms, third group 
consists of norm entrepreneurs. Because all three FTA (with India, Canada, and the 
US) are not public, we can only assume, basing on negotiation mandate, what kind of 
labor standards will be included into future agreement. 
 
II. Free Trade Agreement with South Korea 
 
The European Union in its bilateral and regional agreements generally focused 
on the goals of social development cooperation. It does not apply trade sanctions to 
social norms and labor standards. Countries that have signed and effectively 
implement the fundamental rights of the international conventions of the UN / ILO 
offers additional customs preferences GSP + 15. In 2012, signed a free trade agreement 
between the EU and the Member States and Colombia and Peru both parties are 
committed to the effective implementation of ILO fundamental conventions (Article 
269 paragraph 3 ) and the exchange of information on the progress in the ratification 
of the Convention priority (art. 269 paragraph4). Also recognized that labor standards 
should not be used for protectionist trade purposes, a comparative advantage in this 
respect should not be questioned. Provisions of the free trade agreement between the 
EU and Korea (hereinafter KOREU ), look very similar, where the art. 13.4 relating to 
multilateral norms and agreements on, parties to the agreement are committed to 
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efforts to ratify the core conventions ( Korea signed only four of the eight core 
conventions ) and other conventions that have been classified by the ILO as " updated" 
(paragraph 3). However in the KOREU there is no claim as included in the agreements 
with Peru and Colombia to ban the use of labor standards for commercial purposes, 
which may reduce to a large extent the settlement of disputes on the issue of non-tariff 
related issues of labor law restricting free trade. This is a situation quite special 
considering that South Korea is not a party to the Convention on forced labor, as well 
as the Convention on the law of association, which can affect the nature of the 
relationship between employers and workers and, consequently, increase the 
comparative advantage of that country. Hence, the indicated agreement provided only 
the provisions of the commitment of the parties to respect, promote and reflected in 
regulations and practices applicable fundamental rights of all members of the ILO 
under the Declaration of 1998. Article 13.7 provides for the maintenance of levels of 
environmental protection and labor (paragraph 1 ), and that neither party can weaken 
or limit the protection in the work provided for in its legislation, to stimulate trade and 
investment (paragraph 2), however, an open question is how resolve violations of these 
obligations, because there is no information about the functioning of a consultative 
mechanism on the resolution of disputes in this area. Provided for in Art. 14 dispute 
settlement system also covers issues of labor law, but there is no clear interpretation of 
how the parties would have to prove the link between the breach of the fundamental 
principles and stimulating trade and investment. Although art. 13.12 implies the 
existence of institutional mechanisms, which are designed to support implementation 
of the provisions of Chapter 13, but it is too early to assess the effectiveness of this 
solution. In addition, the internal advisory groups designed to provide advice on the 
implementation of the provisions of Chapter 13, who are " independent representative 
organizations representing civil society organizations in a balanced environmental, 
labor and entrepreneurship, as well as other interested parties" -  are not competent to 
decision-making, but only formulate non-binding opinions. The contents of the 
statement of the Commission annexed to the agreement specifies that its composition 
will compose of equally numerous representations of employers, trade unions and non-
governmental organizations and the European Economic and Social Committee. 
Detailed conditions for the functioning of the group will be agreed with stakeholders. 
This group, functioning at the level of the EU consists of 12 members, representing the 
EESC (3 people), trade unions, entrepreneurs, but also lobbies such as APRODEV 
(associated with the World Council of Churches) and the Eurogroup for Animals . 
 
As of 2014 there is no detailed research on how European labor standards have 
been executed and promoted through FTAs, and existing literature suggests possible 
positive role of dialogue and norms on the European side
16
. Nevertheless I argue that 
one of most important FTA for European economy nowadays, namely KOREU, gives 
rather negative example of European impact, and speculations about future 
improvement are far-fetched. Some scholars pointed out that it’s hard to develop 
common position of the EU in the international arena regarding labor standards. For 
example Marianne Riddervold pointed out that the key to the legislation of the 
Member States relating to the Convention on maritime labor EU preferences were not 
consistent with the preferences of the Member States, which made it difficult to reach 
a common position. The common position of the EU sought to improve the protection 
of workers, even when would result in increased costs. Thus, the normative factor 
prevailed on economic factor. On the other hand Robert Kissack notes that the 
activities of the EU in the ILO is difficult to assess in terms of efficiency or 
convergence of interests of the Member States with the Commission, since in many 
cases the objectives set by the Commission differed from those of the Member States, 
and latter cannot always converged17. Thus it can be argued that strong Member States, 
regardless its position on the map, drawn by Young18, with clearly defined economic 
interests associated with the regulation of labor standard will not support the EU in this 
area. But an example of Convention on maritime labor, which is not ratified, inter alia, 
by United Kingdom, Germany and Italy, clearly shows that as assumption on 
normative claims versus economic issues falls when economic interests are important.  
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When FTAs negotiated and signed the by the EU are very vague by nature, when 
it comes to labor standards, the issue of labor rights in free trade agreements concluded 
by the United States, especially after 2007, is very important. It should be noted that in 
these agreements labor law is the subject of very detailed regulations, and included 
provisions go far beyond the model adopted by the European Union. This is primarily 
due to the fact that the United States, despite membership in the ILO, are not bound by 
a majority of the provisions of international agreements. The US ratified only 14 of the 
189 ILO conventions so far, including two of the eight core conventions (Convention 
on the Abolition of Forced Labour and the Convention on the worst forms of child 
labor ) and one of the four priority Conventions (on tripartite consultation )19. Since the 
proposed agreement will cover highly developed countries, free trade agreements 
concluded by the United States from Peru or Colombia is an appropriate point of 
reference. Some guidance on the content of a future agreement TTIP can supply 
agreement between the U.S. and Australia20. The agreement, in addition to the clause 
commonly found in other agreements, that wrong is to encourage trade or investment 
by weakening or reducing the protection of existing labor law of the parties (Article 
18. 2 point 2 ), defined international rules and rights such as the right of association, 
right to collective bargaining, prohibition of forced labor, child labor and acceptable 
conditions of work (Article 18. 7). These definitions involve two parties, whereby 
Australia has adopted these rules before by ratification of ILO basic conventions. 
Thus, although the United States is not a party to most of the conventions of the ILO 
adopt a kind solutions developed in the various conventions . 
The agreement with Australia also provides the ability to create a working 
subcommittee, composed of representatives of the central government responsible for 
matters of work and employment (Article 18 para. 4, point 2 ). A similar solution has 
been applied in the agreement KOREU, but not as precisely regulated as in the case of 
US- Australia agreement. It would be worthwhile to consider the possibility of 
establishing such an institution in the planned EU-US agreement. This would give the 
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opportunity to effectively resolving disputes related to labor issues and monitoring 
issues related to employment. However, avoiding  general terms and - following in the 
wake of the US- Australia agreement - defined in the chapter on work, concepts such 
as labor law obligations, the parties, etc., as has been done in the art. 18.7 point 2b. 
Such a solution would serve to protect the interests of the Member States, as it would 
limit the ability of interpretation incompatible with the objectives and spirit of the 
international agreement. It is expected that such a solution will pursue by the 
American side, since such a solution appears in one of the recently concluded free 
trade agreements, such as the agreement between the U.S. and Korea ( KORUS ) of 
201121. The KORUS agreement agreed to the appointment of the Labour Affairs 
Council, which task is to ensure the proper performance of the contract (Article 19 
paragraph. 5). Unlike the US- Australia agreement, Labour Council is the body, whose 
appointment is mandatory. Comparing the KORUS agreement and the agreement 
between the EU and Korea, it should be noted that the agreement KOREU has less 
favorable character for the EU ( and Member States), as part of the Korean 
commitments are unclear. This is due to the fact that the agreement makes reference to 
the ILO Declaration, and not to the convention because, as mentioned above, Korea is 
not a party to all core ILO conventions. Such provisions are quite surprising and rise a 
question for future research, namely what kind of arguments prevailed among EU 
negotiators. According to Congressional Research Service, Korean labor market has 
serious flaws and, more than 200 unionist are imprisoned for “exercising labor rights”. 
Moreover labor market is divided into two groups: one-third of labor force, well paid, 
and represented by strong unions, and two-third consists of temporary and day 
workers, without basic labor rights. Adopting European standards, and strengthening 
labor norms could be used as an effective to tool for free trade area, created by 
KOREU. But one might assume, that opening Korean market for European services, 
based on local contractors, will allow to strengthen the position of European 
companies, due to cheap labor. 
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III. Proposed TTIP (Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) 
agreement and CETA (Canada European-Free-Trade-Association Free 
Trade Agreement) 
 
In the negotiating mandate for proposed TTIP agreement the issues of 
employment and work appears in several places. The preamble provides the parties' 
commitment to contribute to sustainable development, including in economic terms, 
including full employment and decent work for all. Moreover the parties' right to take 
measures necessary to protect jobs are emphasized. In the "Goals" (points 8 and 31) 
indicated that the parties should recognize sustainable development as its primary 
objective and that the promotion of a high level of protection of workers' rights will be 
carried out in compliance with international agreements and standards and in 
accordance with the EU acquis and Member States. The development of trade and 
foreign direct investment should not occur as a result of lowering the national labor 
laws or by loosening regulations to protect and promote cultural diversity. That is the 
desire to avoid the race to the bottom, with regards to labor standards. 
This means that on the basis of a new agreement parties can only raise the 
standards of labor protection, the Member States retain the right to their own solutions 
in this area, and in the areas where the EU has competence only if it is in the interest of 
the EU ( for the need to obtain the consent of the EU). It also follows from the fact that 
the right to join and reject ILO conventions remains within the competence of the 
Member States, which allows for the formation of labor standards at the level of 
Member States. In paragraph 18 of dedicated services indicated that the law of the EU 
and the Member States, the regulations and requirements in relation to work and 
employment conditions will continue to apply. 
The most important provision in the negotiating mandate in the area of labor law 
is an indication contained in the section on trade and sustainable development, that 
support decent work is to be done through the implementation of the national 
legislation of basic labor rights, according to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental 
Principles and Rights at work ( paragraph 32). It is envisaged the establishment of a 
coordination mechanism, which is basically a duplicate of solutions of the EU- Korea - 
KOREU, but there is no specific proposals on how this mechanism would work. It is 
anticipated participation of civil society in monitoring the implementation of the 
agreement. However, one can assume that, as in the case of KOREU, representatives 
of civil society will have an advisory vote only, without the possibility of interfering 
with nature and shape of the executed agreement. For example in KOREU no 
possibility of initiating procedures for dispute concerning labor standards by 
representatives of civil society has been provided. It means that civil society 
representatives, and unions, have only advisory voice, and variety of non-
governmental actors have been excluded.  
The new element, which appeared in the proposed negotiating mandate, is the 
inclusion in the proposed agreement " recognized international standards for corporate 
social responsibility ." The inclusion of international corporations among the full-
fledged participants in international relations, which are subject to international legal 
protection, but also have certain obligations, may be questionable. Certainly, corporate 
social responsibility is an essential component of the protection of workers' rights, but 
it should be noted that the judgment of the Supreme Court - the United States on 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.. April 2013 ( docket no. 10-1491 ) restricts the 
claims in the United States based on Alien Tort Statute advanced to the corporation, 
which gives considerable freedom of action of transnational corporations. Placing the 
agreement TTIP provisions relating to corporate social responsibility, should - in 
theory - take into account the responsibilities of transnational corporations for actions 
outside the socially accepted norms . 
Another example of FTA – group III is CETA (Canada European-Free-Trade-
Association Free Trade Agreement). As of July 2014 the final text of CEFTA is 
agreed, but not public. Yet, we don’t know what kind of provisions and standards have 
been developed in the agreement. In 2008 Canada signed Canada–European Free 
Trade Association Free Trade Agreement with EFTA countries (Iceland, Lichtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland) and no special provisions on labor standards were put into 
the final text. However similar agreement between Canada and Colombia is much 
more developed and chapter sixteen (articles 1601 to 1605) envisages Labour 
Cooperation Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia (LCA- 1604). 
Non compliance with LCA may result with financial penalties, due to judgment of 
independent review panel. Such “monetary assessment” in future CETA agreement 
might appear as well.  
*** 
 
Free trade agreements should be treated as litmus for ability of European Union 
to shape treaties with different actors regarding the same area. I argue that labor 
standards are of secondary importance for European Union, and example of Canada 
and United States clearly show its weakness regarding labor standards. It also raises 
the question of European preferences for or against labor standards external policy and 
policy of co-ordination between member states. Yet, I argue that normative elements 
of European external trade policy collapse when national preferences and economic 
interests. However, another explanation is also possible; national governments might 
lost control of agenda setting after presenting their negotiating positions, but it needs 
to be confirmed by empirical research. Another open question for future research is 
role and scope of EU – Korea FTA Civil Society Forum where after five meetings no 
press releases have been issued. 
 
 
 
Ahnlid, Anders. „Setting the Global Trade Agenda: The European Union and the 
Launch of the Doha Round”. W European Union Negotiations: Processes, 
Networks and Institutions, zredagowane przez Ole Elgström i Christer Jönsson, 
130–47. Routledge, 2005. 
Cooper, William H., Michaela D. Platzer, Remy Jurenas, i Mark Manyin. The U.S.-
South Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA): Provisions and 
Implications. Congressional Research Service, 7 marzec 2013. 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40967.pdf. 
Fazzone, Patrick B. „Trans-Pacific Partnership-Towards a Free Trade Agreement of 
Asia-Pacific, The”. Geo. J. Int’l L. 43 (2011): 695. 
Forsberg, Tuomas. „Normative Power Europe, Once Again: A Conceptual Analysis of 
an Ideal Type”. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 49, nr 6 (2011): 
1183–1204. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02194.x. 
Frankowski, Pawel. Economic Partnership Agreements as an instrument of regional 
integration promotion in Sub-Saharan Africa. Natolin Papers 44. Warsaw: 
CEN, 2011. 
Heron, Tony. „Asymmetric bargaining and development trade-offs in the 
CARIFORUM-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement”. Review of 
International Political Economy 18, nr 3 (2011): 328–57. 
doi:10.1080/09692290.2010.481916. 
International Labor Office. Social Dimensions Of Free Trade Agreements. Geneva: 
International Labour Office, 2013. 
Kissack, Robert. „The Performance of the European Union in the International Labour 
Organization”. Journal of European Integration 33, nr 6 (2011): 651–65. 
doi:10.1080/07036337.2011.606689. 
Krapohl, Sebastian, i Simon Fink. „Different Paths of Regional Integration: Trade 
Networks and Regional Institution-Building in Europe, Southeast Asia and 
Southern Africa”. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 51, nr 3 (2013): 
472–88. doi:10.1111/jcms.12012. 
Manners, Ian. „The normative ethics of the European Union”. International Affairs 84, 
nr 1 (2008): 45–60. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2346.2008.00688.x. 
Meunier, Sophie, i Kalypso Nicolaïdis. „The European Union as a conflicted trade 
power”. Journal of European Public Policy 13, nr 6 (2006): 906–25. 
Olivier, Gerrit. „From Colonialism to Partnership in Africa–Europe Relations?” The 
International Spectator 46, nr 1 (marzec 2011): 53–67. 
doi:10.1080/03932729.2011.549754. 
Postnikov, Evgeny, Ida Bastiaens. „Does dialogue work? The effectiveness of labor 
standards in EU preferential trade agreements”. Journal of European Public 
Policy 21, no 6 (2014): 923–40. doi:10.1080/13501763.2014.910869. 
Rousselin, Mathieu. The EU as a Multilateral Rule Exporter. The Global Transfer of 
European Rules via International Organizations. Transformative Power Europe 
Working Papers 48. Berlin: Freie Universitat Berlin, 2012. 
Storey, Andy. „Normative Power Europe? Economic Partnership Agreements and 
Africa”. Journal of Contemporary African Studies 24, nr 3 (2006): 331–46. 
doi:10.1080/02589000600976646. 
Young, Alasdair R. „Trade Politics Ain’t What It Used to Be: The European Union in 
the Doha Round*”. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 45, nr 4 (2007): 
789–811. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.2007.00748.x. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
